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“Scotland’s different”: Narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness in the post-Brexit-vote era 
Anna Gawlewicz 
 
Abstract 
While Scotland has been portrayed as an outlier in the context of Brexit, we know relatively 
little about how ordinary people in Scotland, including a growing migrant population, make 
sense of this (political and media) narrative. In order to address this gap, in this article I look 
at everyday narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness in the post-Brexit-vote era among the 
long-settled population and Polish - and to a lesser degree other European Union - migrants 
in the East End of Glasgow. By drawing upon scholarship on everyday nationalism and 
imagined communities, I explore discursive claims which romanticise Scotland as different 
and “welcoming” of immigration, and position it in binary opposition to England. How is 
Scotland produced as different in the context of Brexit? How are these stories used to re-
imagine increasingly diverse Scottish society? In what ways are they being employed by 
migrant communities?  
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Introduction 
Regional disparities in voting patterns in the United Kingdom’s (UK) 2016 European Union 
(EU) referendum are vivid (Knight, 2017, Dorling, 2016). Against this backdrop, Scotland has 
been portrayed as an outlier because of its overall vote to Remain and, arguably, more 
favourable public attitudes towards immigration (Hepburn and Rosie, 2014, McCollum et al., 
2014). This portrayal needs to be understood against a wider and long-standing narrative of 
Scotland’s distinctiveness in the UK related to its migration history and ethnic diversity on the 
one hand (Smith and Simpson, 2015), and a strong devolved government and independence 
movement on the other (Liinpää, 2018). This grand narrative of distinctiveness has been 
actively maintained by Scottish political elites over decades and has been used for different 
purposes (e.g. to oppose Margaret Thatcher’s administration in the 1980s or to argue for and 
defend devolution in 1990s). More recently, it has been employed by the ruling Scottish 
National Party (SNP) in its efforts to gain more independence for Scotland from the central 
UK government (e.g. in the run up to the 2014 Scottish independence referendum). While in 
the context of Brexit this narrative has been particularly prominent in political and media 
discourses, we know less whether and how it operates within wider Scottish society. How do 
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ordinary people make sense of this narrative? What kind of stories (or myths) of 
distinctiveness are developed and circulated within Scotland’s increasingly diverse 
communities? And, importantly, are these stories picked up, recycled or challenged by 
Scotland’s growing migrant population?  
In this article, I address the above questions by drawing upon 40 interviews with the long-
settled and Polish participants, and an ad hoc focus group with five (non-British) EU nationals 
in the East End of Glasgow. I use the term “long-settled population” as a proxy for UK-born 
participants (with two exceptions). As of early 2020, Poles constitute the largest non-British 
national group in Scotland and the UK accounting for 90,000 and up to one million residents 
respectively (ONS, 2018a, ONS, 2018b). The Polish language is the third most spoken language 
in Scotland (after English and Scots) and the second in England and Wales (after English) (ONS, 
2013, Scotland's Census, 2011). In Glasgow and the East End within it, Polish nationals have 
been argued to contribute to population gain, local economies and transformation ever since 
they started settling in greater numbers following Poland’s accession to the EU in 2004 (Kay 
and Trevena, 2019, Freeke, 2015). Given their status as EU citizens and the fact that they are 
one of the most prominent “new” national minorities in Scotland, it is important to look at 
how they respond to the narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness in the context of Brexit.    
Likewise, the choice of the East End of Glasgow as a research site is deliberate. With a long-
standing history of poverty and deprivation and recent regeneration efforts, the East End is 
undergoing a dramatic change (Clark and Kearns, 2016). While it is predominantly a White 
lower-income area with some sectarian tensions and youth gang activity in the past, 
historically, it was also a site of migrant (e.g. Irish, Italian) settlement. Importantly, in recent 
years it has been attracting increasingly diverse populations, including migrants from Central 
and Eastern Europe, and is currently home to one of the largest Polish communities in 
Glasgow (Kay and Trevena, 2019). The area also constitutes an interesting case study against 
the backdrop of Brexit. Similar to Scotland and Glasgow, it voted overall to remain in the EU 
(62% and 67% respectively). Yet, compared to other constituencies in the city it had most 
Leave voters (44% compared to 22% in Glasgow North, 28% in Glasgow South and 30% in 
Glasgow Central, Paterson, 2016). While reasons for these differences are yet to be rigorously 
investigated, this may be a reflection of the affluence-versus-poverty split between the North-
West and East of Glasgow and a greater discontent with the EU among the residents of the 
latter (Gawlewicz, 2019).  
With this in mind, it may be particularly revealing to juxtapose how the long-settled East End 
residents and Polish (and wider EU) migrants in the area make sense of the narratives of 
Scotland’s distinctiveness. Such stories of national “difference” are by no means unusual and 
are reflective of national myth-making or everyday/banal nationalism (Palmer, 1998, Billig, 
1995). In what ways are they affected by a seismic socio-political event such as Brexit?  
In what follows, I first look at the role of myth-making and debates on the everyday and the 
imagined in nationalism among the established and migrant populations. Second, I reflect on 
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the methodology underpinning the research that this article is based upon. Finally, I explore 
the narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness by focusing on how the long-settled, Polish and a 
small (mixed) group of EU nationals make claims about Scotland.            
Everyday nationalism among the long-settled and migrant populations 
Narratives of national “difference” or “distinctiveness” are one of (many) manifestations of 
so-called everyday nationalism. Everyday nationalism has been on the academic radar for a 
few decades now and draws upon, but also departs from, the notion of banal nationalism 
“embedded in the routines of social life” (Billig, 1995: 175). While banal nationalism is 
primarily concerned with how nations are reproduced in discursive or material ways in our 
daily lives (e.g. via songs, flags, sporting events), everyday nationalism is rather preoccupied 
with how they are called into existence in specific spatiotemporal circumstances (Antonsich 
and Skey, 2017). In other words, everyday nationalism explores the when, where, how and 
why the nation is made or its relational, representational and changing character (Fox and 
Miller-Idriss, 2008, Brubaker et al., 2006, Skey, 2011a). Both these conceptual frames are also 
related to the earlier notion of imagined communities (Anderson, 1991), which revolutionised 
our understanding of the nation by bringing attention to the importance of how it is 
discursively narrated or, indeed, imagined (Antonsich, 2016).  
As part of this discursive turn, some attention has been paid to how grand narratives of 
national “difference” emerge and circulate in society, i.e. how the nation is constructed 
through stories, stereotypes or myth-making (Condor, 2000, Valkonen and Ruuska, 2012). 
Scotland has had its fair share in this body of work and the everyday talk of distinctiveness is 
well documented (e.g. Cohen, 1996, McIntosh et al., 2004, Meer, 2015). Unsurprisingly, 
England occupies a special place in these stories and is routinely produced in essentialist 
terms as Scotland’s “national Other” (Liinpää, 2018). Of course, these everyday stories are 
partly reflective of the fact that Scotland, and its geography, history and culture among 
others, are – as noted earlier - in many ways distinct within the UK (Davidson et al., 2018, 
Hepburn and Rosie, 2014, Hunter and Meer, 2018, Smith and Simpson, 2015). Smith and 
Simpson (2015), for example, explore this distinctiveness in relation to migration and ethnic 
diversity. Historically, Scotland was largely a country of emigration with significant numbers 
of Scots leaving for North America, Australia or New Zealand among others (Harper, 2003) 
and a diaspora of over 30 million as of early 21st century (Sim, 2011). This does not mean that 
there was no immigration to Scotland (note e.g. significant Irish or Italian settlements 
throughout the 19th century; for a useful overview see Edwards, 2016). But scope and 
magnitude of these population movements were different compared to England and Wales 
leading to differences in ethnic composition (e.g. the 20th-century migrations from the 
Commonwealth countries were experienced on a much smaller scale in Scotland). Likewise, 
Scotland’s long-standing independence movement, strong devolved government and more 
recent EU sympathies among political elites are further examples of the county’s difference 
within the UK. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that there is an intricate connection 
between Scotland’s actual distinctiveness and what is made of it in everyday (and banal) 
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myth-making. Importantly, while how these stories operate and what function they play has 
been well researched, we know relatively little whether major political events such as Brexit 
impact on them and in what ways (although note an emerging scholarship on the 2014 
Scottish independence referendum, e.g. Liinpää, 2018). Essentially, how is the nation re-
imagined through such events?   
Crucially, everyday nationalism, and national myth-making as its manifestation, are not only 
discussed with regard to established populations. There are two significant bodies of work 
focussing on what is reminiscent of everyday nationalism among international migrants and 
diasporas more broadly. Firstly, there is an established scholarship on the so-called long-
distance nationalism (Anderson, 1992), i.e. identity claims that migrants make to a specific 
place viewed as their ancestral home (Bielewska, 2012, Mavroudi, 2010, Burrell, 2006). 
Secondly, there is somewhat separate literature on the constructions of home vis-à-vis “host” 
society (Christou, 2011, Christou and King, 2010, Gawlewicz, 2015, Horolets and Kozłowska, 
2012, Skey, 2011b). The former has broadly looked at the production of national identities 
and how they are fostered, celebrated and challenged among migrant populations, for 
instance the Polish in England (Bielewska, 2012). The latter is situated within wider work on 
migration and orientalist imaginaries and posits complex ways in which the country of origin 
and destination are (re-)made through the process of migration. For example, reflecting on 
my earlier research (Gawlewicz, 2015), I have found that Polish migrants in the UK may 
discursively construct Polishness and Britishness in binary oppositions underpinned by 
orientalist understandings of Poland as the iconic East and the UK as West. This suggests that 
migrant populations are actively involved in producing and circulating stories about not only 
their country of origin but the one(s) of destination. Yet, with some notable exceptions (e.g. 
Liinpää, 2018), there is little discussion about how they engage with the grand narratives of 
“difference” produced in the “host” society. And so the question remains: how do migrants 
respond these stories? 
Methodology 
In the paper, I draw upon a subset of data collected for the project Living together in the 
context of Brexit: Migrant-‘host’ encounters in the East End of Glasgow funded by the Urban 
Studies Foundation and looking at the interplay of community relations, migration, political 
hostile environment and the city (March 2017 - December 2019). This includes 40 in-depth 
interviews and a focus group with the residents of Glasgow’s East End. The interviews were 
split equally between the long-settled population and Polish nationals (20 with each). The 
focus group involved five EU nationals from Czech Republic, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland 
and Romania. In total, 45 residents were involved. 
As mentioned, I use the term “long-settled population” to refer to UK-born participants (with 
two exceptions). While these participants were predominantly White Scottish, this group was, 
indeed, diverse and included Asian Scottish, English and Irish people as well as one dual-
national (Italian-British). As noted, I purposefully selected Polish migrants as members of the 
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most numerous non-UK population in Scotland attracting significant public and media 
attention since mid-2000s. My initial plan was to focus on these two groups exclusively. 
However, as a number of non-Polish/non-British EU nationals in the East End expressed a 
strong desire to get involved in the study (in particular in relation to Brexit), I organised an ad 
hoc focus group to further include their perspectives. Both interviews and the focus group 
were conducted between July 2017 and April 2018 and explored, among other things, how 
Brexit shapes migrant/‘host’ relations in Scotland, everyday interactions in Glasgow’s East End 
as well as solidarities and concerns, and a sense of belonging to the area.  
The participants were recruited via gatekeepers (e.g. community organisations), leafleting in 
Polish and wider community venues, social media (e.g. facebook) and chain referral, and 
included 27 women and 18 men between the mid-20s and late 70s. They were diverse in 
terms of religion/belief, class, sexuality as well as attitudes towards Brexit. They also had 
different education levels and employment statuses although the overall sample was skewed 
towards the better-educated (roughly two thirds either held a university degree or were 
university students) and employed (around 80% were in some form of employment; the rest 
were either students or retired; only one person was unemployed). It is worth noting that a 
number of Polish participants worked below their actual qualifications, which is reflective of 
deskilling among Polish migrants in Scotland (Moskal, 2013). However, this group included 
also highly-skilled professionals, business owners and students. Throughout the overall 
sample, participants had lived in the East End between 3 months and 68 years. Unsurprisingly, 
many of the long-settled participants had a long-standing connection with the area and had 
lived there 16.5 years on average. Polish participants and the EU nationals in the focus group 
had all migrated to Scotland as adults and lived in the East End for 4.5 years on average.        
As a bilingual researcher, I conducted the interviews either in English (with long-settled and 
focus group participants) or Polish (with Polish participants with one exception). 
Subsequently, I employed narrative analysis (across both languages) to explore the overall 
material. Hence, excerpts from the interviews and the focus group in English are verbatim 
and the ones in Polish have been translated into English. I use pseudonyms throughout the 
article to maintain participant anonymity.    
Narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness 
Narratives of Scotland’s “difference” or “distinctiveness” in the context of Brexit were often 
produced by the long-settled and migrant participants. In particular, questions about changes 
in the East End since the Brexit referendum and feelings about Brexit (explored in both 
interviews and the focus group) prompted participants to reflect on Scotland. These 
narratives were relatively similar across the long-settled and migrant participants, although 
the trope of Scotland’s distinctiveness was more implicit in the stories of the former. Migrant 
participants, on the other hand, tended to use the term “difference” or “distinctiveness” 
explicitly followed by examples of how Scotland was different in their eyes.  
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Interestingly, in these narratives Scotland was frequently discussed in relation to England as 
a “national Other” (Liinpää, 2018). This is reflected in the extract from the focus group below. 
Interviewer: Have you noticed any changes in your neighbourhood? 
Erik: No, you would have to go to England for that [laughter], because in Manchester 
I have Dutch friends (…) and [we] would be speaking Dutch and there would be 
comments, which is really, you know, I’ve not had - never in Scotland. 
Interviewer: [responding to another participant nodding] You agree Jadzia?  
Jadzia: Yeah, yeah. I heard a story from my friend. He’s half Italian and half (…) from 
Thailand. (…) He’d been living in England for a long time (…) and had this situation 
where he was speaking with his parents on the phone and someone shouted like: 
‘Why are you speaking Italian? You have to speak English’. (focus group with EU 
nationals: Erik, Dutch man in his late 50s; Jadzia, Polish woman in her late 20s) 
 
Throughout interviews, where participants typically had more time to reflect on their feelings, 
Scotland was widely perceived as “more welcoming”, “open and tolerant” and “friendlier” as 
opposed to England, which was demonised as “unfriendly”, “anti-immigrant” or even “racist”. 
England was clearly othered, i.e. made to be intrinsically different, in these stories and served 
as an imaginary opposite or a binary outside.  
I’m so happy that I live in Scotland not England, because from what I hear and read 
(…)  there are some real racist sentiments in England because of Brexit, you know? 
Whereas in Scotland, you just sense this everywhere: Scots say that they like Poles, 
Poles are OK, hard-working, right? ‘We don’t want you to leave.’ (Wojtek, Polish man 
in his late 20s)    
Scotland is an open country. Even after Brexit [referendum] people were still… 
Because Scotland didn’t want to leave [the EU] first of all. It’s different here. There’ve 
never been larger racist incidents here – of course, they happen everywhere but it 
doesn’t really happen here that people protest and attack others because of their 
religion or culture or skin colour. Scotland’s always been a mixed country, everything 
has been mixed here, even historically (…) there are Scandinavian influences, 
everyone’s friendlier, there’s no hatred. Scotland’s just more open, Brits [sic] are self-
righteous, they think so highly of themselves - that they’re the best. (Marcin, Polish 
man in his late 30s)    
It is also worthwhile to mention that Brexit was largely seen as an “English vote” and Brexit 
negotiations as the “Westminster’s imposition”. There were some highly controversial claims 
that Scottish people “did not” or “would not” vote to Leave. Such claims are very problematic 
not least because a significant 38% of voters in Scotland opted for Leave in the Brexit 
referendum. They also draw on essentialist understandings of (national) identity and – as 
noted earlier – binary othering of England. Importantly, these were sometimes entangled 
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with narratives of Scotland’s independence, in particular in interviews with the long-settled 
participants.   
It’s different in England. I think in Scotland we’re still a little bit kind of, maybe a bit 
relaxed or laid back about it, or kind of - it’s caught up with the independence 
question as well in Scotland and I voted yes in the independence referendum. I 
strongly believe that the country should be independent of the Commonwealth and 
Britain. (Oonagh, long-settled Scottish woman in her late 30s) 
In Glasgow it was remain. (…) Scottish people, you know, they will become more open 
(…) because of Brexit, because I mean they voted to remain. And bloody England 
voted to leave. They [Scottish people] want to distinguish themselves and so they’re 
not hostile at all to the different ones [foreigners], you know? (Enzo, long-settled 
Italian-British man in his early 40s) 
Somewhat unexpectedly, historical and cultural parallels were sometimes drawn in particular 
in interviews with Polish participants. In these narratives, examples were given of the 
allegedly shared history of oppression between Poland and Scotland, cultural proximity or 
what some participants would vaguely call a “similar mentality”. This is evident in the three 
quotes below.  
I think Scottish people are like Poles. I feel attachment to and… a sense of familiarity 
with Scots, but not with the English. (…) It’s the same sense of freedom and respect 
of the freedom of others. (Sławek, Polish man in his mid-50s)     
It only occurred to me after a while… that Scotland is kind of under British occupation. 
The UK is imposing everything on them, right? That’s why they don’t like the English. 
But, luckily, they like us [Polish people]. (Wojtek, Polish man in his late 20s) 
I think the East European people, they’re more like us: they like their football, they 
like their drink. (Des, long-settled Scottish man in his late 70s)  
In the first quote, Sławek discusses freedom as a value of particular significance to both Polish 
and Scottish people. Sławek implies that understandings of freedom in Poland and Scotland 
are similar because they are strongly embedded in history, in particular the history of 
oppression and dependence on external powers. These historical parallels are also evident in 
Wojtek’s narrative. Scotland is being described here as being under “British” occupation. 
While this is not captured in the quote, Wojtek implicitly likens Scotland’s history to Poland’s 
experience of the partitions (1772-1918) and the Nazi Germany and Soviet Union occupation 
during World War II (1939-1945). The final quote, on the other hand, focuses on the alleged 
cultural parallels between Scots and – in Des’ words - “East Europeans” (the term sometimes 
used by the long-settled participants as a proxy for Polish migrants). These seem to include 
everyday habits, lifestyles and activities (here exemplified by football and drinking culture).      
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In contrast to what the empirical material may suggest so far, when the interviews focussed 
on actual experience rather than purely discursive claims, participants did recall some 
instances of Brexit-related racism and xenophobia broadly discussed in wider Brexit literature 
(Rzepnikowska, 2018, Guma and Dafydd Jones, 2018). However, somewhat surprisingly, these 
were often downplayed or even excused, in particular by Polish participants. This is reflected 
in the two quotes below in which racism is clearly excused because the perpetrators allegedly 
had had what is referred to as “limited knowledge” (Urszula) and the public display of fascist 
symbols had not translated to actual violence (Sławek).  
Straight after the referendum, I had this situation: I was speaking to someone on the 
street [in Polish] and there was a group of Scottish lads in their 20s, they were passing 
by… and there were comments because they recognised our language, right? But I 
think that they simply didn’t know what was going on, they didn’t know the 
circumstances. They simply had limited knowledge. (Urszula, Polish woman in her mid-
40s) 
I think it’s different here. I haven’t heard of any instances of hate crime here, but you 
hear a lot about other places in the UK. I don’t know if there were any concerning news 
from Scotland. 
Interviewer: There were - from Glasgow… Someone put up stickers with Nazi symbols 
in some neighbourhoods. 
Well, they might have put some stickers on - so what?! Has anything happened to 
anybody? But, it did elsewhere in the UK. (Sławek, Polish man in his mid-50s)     
 
The second quote by Sławek is particularly interesting here. When Sławek said that he had 
not heard of any instances of racism post-Brexit-referendum, I challenged him by providing a 
local example from Glasgow. He responded in somewhat confrontational way as if to imply 
that I was exaggerating because – to use his reasoning – nothing happened to anybody. 
Both the above and earlier narratives are quite revealing. What comes across strongly is that 
Scotland is being re-imagined against the backdrop of Brexit, i.e. Brexit is impacting on how 
Scotland is called into existence as a discursive figure or, in other words, a discursive nation. 
Firstly, it is constructed as fundamentally different through reviving but also repositioning the 
long-standing narratives of historical, cultural and political distinctiveness (e.g. a narrative of 
favourable attitudes towards immigration, see Hepburn and Rosie, 2014, McCollum et al., 
2014). It appears that what has been largely a political elite projection until recently (Liinpää, 
2018, Davidson and Virdee, 2018) is being increasingly internalised by ordinary people and 
manifests itself in everyday talk (cf. Hussain and Miller, 2006 in relation to Scotland’s 
devolution).  
Secondly, Scotland is not re-made in isolation. Rather, it is produced in relation to England. 
Hence, this re-making is relational and based on the well-known principle of binary othering:  
Us versus Them. Of course, it should be emphasised that the storied Scotland and England 
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are first and foremost imagined or ideational (cf. Anderson, 1991). While they may be acted 
upon and have most “real” consequences for people, they are not necessarily “lived” as the 
recalled instances of post-Brexit racism and xenophobia illustrate. Instead, they are part of 
the myth-making which casts Scotland as the heroine and England as the villain.  
Finally, it is crucial to note that this binary production and wider myth-making are, indeed, 
picked up by Scotland’s migrant population. In fact, throughout the interviews migrant 
participants were more likely to produce the narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness than 
their long-settled counterparts. How exactly this is related to their migration experience is yet 
to be explored, although it could be linked to the desire to integrate into Scottish society or 
being viewed as such by the established population.          
Arguably, the extent to which Scotland and England are being reproduced is reflective of the 
divisive power of Brexit. Clearly, the material quoted in this article illustrates that Brexit has 
the capacity to re-shape the national grand narrative and re-invent Scotland versus England 
(as well as more broadly in relation to the UK or other societies for that matter). This is 
worrying not least because such myth-making draws upon essentialist rhetoric and 
problematic binary relationships. It also (re-)creates negative stereotypes and a sense of 
suspicion, difference and tension (if discursive).  
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have explored narratives of Scotland’s distinctiveness in the context of Brexit. 
In particular, I have looked at how Scotland is re-imagined in everyday talk of the long-settled 
and Polish residents (and a small group of other non-British EU citizens) in the East End of 
Glasgow.  
I have found that Brexit is re-shaping how Scotland is narrated and impacting on its 
positioning versus England as its “national Other”. In participants’ stories, Scotland is not only 
an outlier in how it voted in the EU referendum: it emerges as profoundly different or, in 
participants’ words, “welcoming”, “inclusive” and “tolerant”. Otherwise speaking, it is broadly 
(and uncritically) romanticised. I have also established that Polish/EU migrants pick up and re-
circulate this narrative. This is worth further research as it may have far-reaching implications 
for the increasingly diverse Scottish society.  
The reported tendency to romanticise Scotland is, indeed, fascinating. Could it be reflective 
of an attempt to escape or “wash hands” from Brexit? Or an attempt to defend the nation, or 
the “host” society? Could it be related to a Brexit fatigue that I noted among research 
participants during my fieldwork in 2017-2018 (cf. Gawlewicz and Sotkasiira, 2020)? The 
everyday nationalism scholarship suggests that myth-making plays an important role in 
constructing and maintaining national identity (Fox and Miller-Idriss, 2008, Palmer, 1998, 
Skey and Antonsich, 2017). Essentially, it is something people can hold on to as a group. This 
may be even more evident in the context of political turbulence such as Brexit. Perhaps, 
sticking to a romantic vision of “different” Scotland is part of the everyday processing of a 
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complex, emotional and deeply consequential act of exiting the EU (which is, indeed, taking 
place against the will of a significant proportion of Scottish society and many EU nationals in 
Scotland)?    
Against this backdrop, it is also important to emphasise the discrepancy between discursive 
claims made by research participants and their actual lived experience. It is clear that how 
they (in particular migrants) spoke of Scotland was sometimes contrasting with their 
experiences of racism and xenophobia. Yet, they did not recognise these experiences as such 
or diminished them in the light of the narrative of “different” and “welcoming” Scotland. This 
exposes how powerful such grand narratives can be and that they may have real-life 
consequences for people and societies (cf. Anderson, 1991).    
While illustrative of some of the rhetorical undercurrents in the increasingly diverse Scottish 
society, the article has an important limitation. Even though Scotland voted overall to Remain 
in the Brexit referendum, it is crucial not to lose sight of the fact that a substantial 38% of 
voters did opt for Leave. Meanwhile, the vast majority of both the long-settled and migrant 
participants in this study were strongly opposing Brexit. This could have manifested itself in 
more vivid narratives of distinctiveness. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to repeat this 
study with a well-balanced research sample to ascertain that a range of political views is 
appropriately considered.        
By looking at everyday myth-making about Scotland in the post-Brexit-vote era, in this article 
I have contributed to the body of work on nationalism in Scotland and its regional 
distinctiveness in the UK (Davidson et al., 2018, Hepburn and Rosie, 2014, Meer, 2015, Smith 
and Simpson, 2015). Through focusing on Brexit, and by exploring perspectives of both the 
long-settled and migrant population, I have added a new layer to the growing scholarship on 
migration, Brexit and diverse UK communities (e.g. Botterill, 2018, Brahic and Lallement, 
2018, Guma and Dafydd Jones, 2018, Lulle et al., 2018). In a wider context, the article provides 
an original perspective on how nations are re-imagined in turbulent times. Given the global 
rise of populism and neo-nationalism in recent years (exemplified in Trump’s administration 
in the United States or Orbán’s in Hungary, amongst others), understanding of how nations 
come to existence in everyday talk is becoming a key concern for contemporary societies and 
social science research. 
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